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Achieving Better Privacy Protection in Wireless Sensor Networks
Using Trusted Computing
Abstract
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an ad-hoc wireless network composed of small sensor
nodes deployed in large numbers. Sensor nodes are usually severely resource limited and power
constrained. They are often deployed in accessible areas and interact closely with their physical
surroundings and people. Security enforcement in WSNs is thus a challenging task. In this paper
we propose a clustered heterogeneous architecture for WSNs, where high-end cluster heads are
incorporated, and the cluster heads are further equipped with trusted computing technology
(TC). As such, the cluster heads act as trusted parties, and are expected to help effectively
address privacy issues in WSNs. As concrete examples, we discuss in details how user query
privacy and source location privacy can be better protected in such TC-enabled WSNs.
1 Introduction
Emerging as an important new technology, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have a wide range of
potential applications, especially in the realtime monitoring scenarios, such as battlefield surveil-
lance, wildlife tracking, healthcare monitoring, emergency response and earthquake monitoring. A
WSN consists of a large number of sensor nodes collecting environmental data. The sensor nodes
communicate wirelessly and self-organize after being deployed in an ad hoc manner. The nodes are
usually severely constrained in computation, storage, communication and power resources.
When deployed in critical applications, mechanisms must be in place to secure a WSN. Security
issues associated with WSNs can be categorized into two broad classes [26]: content-related security,
and contextual security. Content-related security deals with security issues related to the content
of data traversing the sensor network such as data secrecy, integrity, and key exchange. Numerous
efforts have recently been dedicated to content-related security issues, such as secure routing [17,
18, 24, 37], key management and establishment [5, 8, 10, 27, 28, 29, 30, 39, 45], access control
[43, 46], and data aggregation [6, 16, 31, 38]. In many cases, it does not suffice to just address
the content-related security issues . Suppose a sensitive event triggers a packet being sent over the
network; while the content of the packet is encrypted, knowing which node sends the packet reveals
the location where the event occurs. Contextual security is thus concerned with protecting such
contextual information associated with data collection and transmission.
It is commonly acknowledged that the resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes makes se-
curity enforcement in WSNs a challenging task. The majority of the above mentioned efforts
attempted to solve security issues in homogeneous WSNs where all sensor nodes have the same
capabilities. However, both theoretical and empirical studies have concluded that homogeneous
WSNs are not scalable. Through a theoretical analysis it is shown in [13] that the throughput of
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each sensor node decreases rapidly as the numbers of nodes increases; in addition, it is demon-
strated via simulations in [9] that, as the traffic becomes heavy, the overhead due to routing and
control consumes a large portion of the available bandwidth.
Our Contribution To improve the effectiveness of security enforcement, we present a trusted
computing (TC)-enabled clustered heterogeneous WSN architecture, composed of not only resource
constrained sensor nodes, but also a number of more powerful high-end devices acting as cluster
heads. Compared to sensor nodes, a high-end cluster head has higher computation capability,
larger storage, longer power supply, and longer radio transmission range, and it thus does not
suffer from the resource scarceness problem as much as a sensor node does. A distinct feature of
our heterogeneous architecture is that cluster heads are equipped with trusted computing (TC)
technology, and in particular a TCG-compliant TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [41] is embedded
into each cluster head. According to the TCG specifications, TPM is a tamper-resistant, self-
contained secure coprocessor, capable of performing cryptographic functions. A TPM attached
to a host establishes a trusted computing platform that provides sealed storage, and measures
and reports the integrity state of the platform. More discussions on TCG/TPM are provided in
Section 2. In our architecture, the TC-enabled cluster heads act as online trusted parties; security
enforcement is thus expected to be substantially simplified and improved. We further substantiate
the above assertion by demonstrating how trusted cluster heads help to provide elegant solutions
for two important contextual security problems, user query privacy [7] and source location privacy
[26, 32, 34, 36], both under a strong adversarial model.
Organization In Section 2, as preliminary knowledge we give a brief overview of the TCG/TPM.
We then present a TC-enabled heterogeneous architecture for WSNs in Section 3. In Section 4,
we show how to efficiently achieve user query privacy and source location privacy in TC-enabled
WSNs. We review related work in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries: Overview of TCG/TPM
The latest effort in trusted computing is represented by the Trusted Computing Platform spec-
ifications defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [41]. The specifications aim to provide
hardware based roots of trust through a tamper resistant coprocessor, Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). A TPM is attached to a host machine and acts as the root of trust of the host platform,
given its tamper resistance property. TPM is capable of performing cryptographic functions such
as random number generation, SHA1 hash function, and RSA encryption and digital signature.
A core functionality provided by TPM is integrity measurement and storage, and reporting
of the state of the host platform. Integrity measurement metrics that represent the state of the
underlying platform are stored by a set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), internal to
TPM. Each PCR value is a 20-byte SHA1 hash digest of a number of measured platform integrity
metrics. Altogether the PCRs record the integrity status of the host platform from booting to OS
loading to loading of the protected applications. An update to a PCR value is through what is
termed extending the PCR, which is described as
PCR[i]← SHA1(PCR[i]||newly measured value)
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where i is the index of the PCR being updated. Since a PCR value is a digest of the platform
state (which results from a series of state altering events), it is meaningless by itself. The data that
complements PCRs in providing semantics is Stored Measurement Log (SML). The SML stores the
complete event history for all the PCRs, and each PCR has corresponding entries in the SML that
records the series of events leading to the current PCR value . The SML is stored unprotected
outside the TPM. This however does not compromise integrity as the corresponding digests are
stored in PCRs, and “extending a PCR” can only be performed by TPM protected capabilities.
The PCR values, together with the corresponding entries of the SML, are used as evidence to attest
to the current state of the host platform.
Upon request, TPM can report the state of its underlying platform to a remote challenging entity
through attestation. In particular, TPM has a number of key pairs called Attestation Identity
Keys (AIKs), which are used as aliases of the unique Endorsement Key (EK). The attestation
protocol proceeds as follows. (1) The challenging entity issues a challenge message, indicating that
it wants to inspect one or more PCR values. (2) A Platform Agent collects the related SML entries
corresponding to the requested PCR values. (3) TPM sends the Platform Agent the requested
PCR values signed by the private key of an AIK. (4) The Platform Agent sends the signed PCR
values, together with the relevant SML entries and the AIK certificate to the challenging entity. (5)
The challenging entity verifies the replied data - the AIK certificate is validated, the measurement
digest is computed from the SML entries and compared with the signed PCR values.
Another security function provided by TPM is Sealed Storage, which encrypts sensitive data with
integrity measurement values. In particular, the data to be protected is encrypted/sealed together
with one or more PCR values. Subsequently, TPM releases an encrypted data only if the current
PCR values match those stored during encryption. In other words, if the state of a platform is
modified, the encrypted data in the sealed storage under that state will not be decrypted/unsealed.
The encryption key is protected either by the Storage Root Key (SRK) internal to TPM, or by a
key protected by the SRK.
3 A TC-enabled Heterogeneous Architecture for WSNs
3.1 The Architecture
We partition a WSN into a number of clusters. A high-end device is placed into each cluster,
acting as the cluster head. In contrast to sensor nodes, high-end cluster heads have relatively higher
computation capability, larger storage size, and longer radio range. They also have longer power
supply, and in some circumstances they can even be line-powered, e.g., when a WSN is deployed
to monitor a building, the cluster heads can easily tap on the electricity lines to get power supply.
Therefore unlike sensor nodes, cluster heads do not drastically suffer from the resource scarceness
problem. The introduction of high-end cluster heads into a WSN makes the once homogeneous
network heterogeneous. The general heterogeneous architecture is depicted in Figure 1.
Downlink communication (from base station to sensor nodes) and uplink communication (from
senor nodes to base station) in the architecture are asymmetric. Messages broadcast by the base
station can directly reach sensor nodes, whereas messages sent by a sensor node need to be for-
warded by its corresponding cluster head. As a result, uplink communication follows a hierarchical
manner and consists of intra-cluster and inter-cluster communications, respectively. At the level
of intra-cluster communication, a cluster head acts as a gateway for the sensor nodes within the
3
	

		
Figure 1: Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Network
cluster; a sensor node can reach the cluster head directly, or through a short multi-hop channel.
A fundamental criteria for cluster partition is that the number of intermediary hops of a multi-
hop channel must be small. Inter-cluster communication is concerned with communication among
cluster heads and the base station. Since cluster heads are not severely constrained by resources
and power supply, inter-cluster communication does not suffer from the limits upon sensor nodes,
and it can utilize more advanced communication infrastructure, e.g. 802.11 or even wired network,
depending on applications. Consequently, the heterogeneous architecture is expected to enormously
improves the overall system performance and lifetime of the network.
A feature distinguishing our architecture from other similar heterogeneous ones (e.g., [19, 20,
44]) is that we equip each cluster head with a TPM, so as to simplify and improve security enforce-
ment in WSNs. The rationale is that under the auspices of TPM, cluster heads can act as online
trusted parties in enforcing security mechanisms. Relevant entities, e.g., the base station or users
who query the network (see Section 4.1), can ascertain the trustfulness of cluster heads by means
of attestation. We notice that the authors of [14, 23] also discussed the idea of applying trusted
computing technology to equipping more powerful cluster heads within WSNs, and there should
be no distinction in the network architecture between ours and theirs. However, in their proposals,
sensor nodes are responsible for verifying the platform state of the cluster heads through attesta-
tion, whereas our proposal is that sensor nodes never challenge their cluster heads for attestation
(we believe they actually do not afford to do so), and they simply trust their respective cluster
heads. Our argument relies on the fact that it is the end users (or the owner) of the network who
should be concerned with the trustfulness of the cluster heads and the network.
Advantages The TC-enabled heterogeneous architecture has a number of advantages.
1. Partitioning a network into clusters makes management of the network scalable. Incorporat-
ing high-end cluster heads simplifies management of sensor nodes, as the base station can delegate
management and adminstration of sensor nodes to their respective cluster heads. This enables easy
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node dynamics such as node join and node departure, because node dynamics within a cluster are
managed by the corresponding cluster head, which is closer to the sensor nodes.
2. High-end cluster heads help to reduce the amount of data that must traverse the network,
thereby enhancing the over system throughput. For example, a cluster head is aware of the topology
of the cluster where it resides, thus it can easily take charge of routing information within the cluster.
Sensor nodes no longer need to discover routing paths by themselves, which is an energy-consuming
process; they simply obtain routing information from their cluster head.
3. Cluster heads amortize the workload of security enforcement, preventing the base station
from becoming the system bottleneck (virtually all existing work depends on the base station for
security enforcement). Further, the use of multiple cluster heads avoids the base station as the
single point of vulnerability as in homogeneous networks.
4. Cooperation of cluster heads makes it possible to provide resilient security solutions, e.g.,
using threshold cryptographic techniques.
3.2 Configuration of Cluster Head
Depending on application scenarios, hardware capabilities of cluster head may vary from that
comparable to a bluetooth device to that of a high end PDA. The TCG is currently working on the
specifications for Trusted Mobile Platforms, whose core element is Mobile Trusted Module (MTM),
similar to TPM for PCs [42]. Prototype implementation of MTM were already available (e.g., [40]).
Hence, we believe that there exists no technical barrier to implement our envisioned TC-enabled
cluster head, although for the moment no off-the-shelf such devices are available.
A trusted computing platform can be implemented as a restricted system or an open system.
The former runs a small set of protected applications, while the latter runs both protected and
unprotected applications. We choose to design the cluster head as a restricted trusted computing
platform due to its specialized functionality and application in WSNs. A reference platform config-
uration of cluster head is shown in Figure 2. The platform runs the sole ClusterH application. At
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Figure 2: A Reference Cluster Head Platform Configuration
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the application layer, the ClusterH program includes four main components. The trusted computing
agent (or TC agent) is the interface that accesses the functionalities provided by the underlying
TPM/MTM such as sealed storage and integrity reporting mechanisms. The security module is
dedicated to implementing the designated WSN security mechanisms (e.g., the algorithms to im-
plement user query privacy and source location privacy). The sensor agent is the communication
interface with sensor nodes, while the base station agent is the interface with the base station or
other cluster heads. The OS layer implements the secure kernel, bridging between the applica-
tion layer and the hardware layer. The hardware layer includes a TCG-compliant TPM/MTM,
providing hardware based root of trust.
4 Addressing Privacy Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks
Equipped with TPM/MTM, the secure kernel and the ClusterH software, cluster heads act as
online trusted parties. To show the effect of the trusted cluster heads on security enforcement,
in this section we present solutions to two important contextual security problems in WSNs: user
query privacy and source location privacy. Compared to existing solutions in [7, 26, 32, 34, 36], our
schemes achieve better privacy and higher efficiency.
Adversary Model For the schemes presented below, we assume a global eavesdropper who eaves-
drops on the entire network. In particular, the adversary is able to watch all the traffic traversing
the sensor network. An adversary of this nature poses a great threat, especially to contextual
security in WSNs.
The global adversary in our consideration is much stronger than the local eavesdropper assumed
by other work such as [7, 26, 34, 36]. A local eavesdropper only has knowledge on the sensor node
it stays with, and it can only trace communication hop by hop. We must stress that the privacy
offered by the schemes in [7, 26, 34, 36] is immediately broken under the global adversary, because
through global eavesdropping the adversary can always know which node(s) initiates the targeted
data transmission.
4.1 Achieving User Query Privacy
4.1.1 Problem Statement
WSNs are often deployed to provide services to other users than the network owner [7]. Users are
allowed to query a network to get sensed data from particular areas. In such a scenario, a user
may wish to protect her “areas of interest” from being disclosed to other users or even the network
owner. User query privacy is thus concerned with the following problem: suppose a user queries
the network, intending to get the sensed data in cluster ci, a user query privacy scheme ensures
that the user ends up getting the desired data, but the adversary does not learn ci by observing
the communication.
4.1.2 Our Algorithm
Network Model We support roaming users querying a wireless sensor network. The network
follows the heterogeneous architecture proposed earlier: the whole network is partitioned into a
set of n clusters, c1, c2, ..., cn, where ci is the identifier of the ith cluster; each cluster is grouped
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around a TC-enabled cluster head and we denote chi the cluster head in ci. A user who desires to
query the network first contacts the nearest cluster head within her proximity, through which she
will issue queries. This cluster head is called access point. Taking Figure 3 as an example, ch1 of
c1 is the access point for the user.
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Figure 3: A User Uses the Cluster Head of c1 as Her Access Point
Once the access point is determined, all the other cluster heads need to dynamically establish
routing pathes to the access point. As cluster heads do not drastically suffer from limited resources,
some well studied routing techniques for networking could be applied here for the purpose of routing
path construction. It is our recommendation to use the single-path routing presented in [26] due to
its high efficiency and simplicity. The single-path routing uses a greedy algorithm where each node
chooses one of its neighboring nodes that is nearest to the sink (i.e., the access point in our case) as
its forwarding node in data transmission, and the node itself is a dependent node of the forwarding
node. As a result, the routing pathes form a tree rooted at the access point. For the example in
Figure 3, the routing pathes are shown in dotted lines. After the routing pathes are formed, every
cluster head knows which node is its forwarding node, and which nodes are its dependent nodes.
Assumption To obtain services from a WSN, a user is assumed to have a certain means to
authenticate to the WSN. Also, a TC-enabled cluster head can authenticate to users using the AIK
of its embedded TPM/MTM. Therefore, the access point and the querying user can accomplish
mutual authentication, based on which we assume the two entities share a secret key for semantic
secure symmetric encryption. Further, it is also easy for each cluster head to get this secret
key from the access point, since they can clearly authenticate each other with the help of their
respective AIKs. We denote Echi(.) and Dchi() the encryption and decryption, respectively, by chi
using this secret key. We also assume each cluster head shares a secret cluster key (for semantic
secure symmetric encryption) with all sensor nodes in its cluster. Several well studied key exchange
schemes [29, 30] can achieve this objective. CEci(.) and CDci() denote the encryption and decryption,
respectively, using the cluster key of ci.
Algorithm Overview A straightforward way to achieve query privacy is that every cluster head
sends encrypted data to the access point, who then forwards only the data desired by the user.
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This however unnecessarily wastes communication bandwidth among cluster heads. Even for this
straightforward method, we should still be very cautious not to leak information about the queried
cluster from the size of the data returned to the user. More specifically, clusters normally have
different number of sensor nodes, so data from different clusters are likely to have different lengthes.
Let us suppose the data from each sensor node forms a packet for simplicity. The total number of
packets from a cluster equals the number of sensor nodes. Without privacy treatment, the number
of packets eventually returned to the user by the access point would clearly indicate the cluster
from which the data originates. A method to fix this problem is that regardless of which cluster
is queried, the access point returns a fixed-number of packets, corresponding to the biggest cluster
size. We use l to denote this number thereafter. For a cluster whose size is smaller than l, dummy
packets are generated.
The basic idea of our approach is to only transmit packets from the queried cluster to the access
point. However, to hide the target cluster, all the remaining clusters have to generate fake data
transmission of the same pattern as that of the queried cluster. To better convey our idea, let
us continue to use Figure 3 as an example. Suppose c6 is the target queried cluster. The data
transmission starts with ch9, ch8, ch5 and ch4, who are the tails of the respective routing pathes.
Let us however only explain the transmission involving the target cluster c6, as others follow the
same manner. The cluster head ch9 generates and sends l dummy packets E lch9(dummy data) to
ch6. We use E lci(data) to denote l packets of encryption of data by chi. ch6 knows that its cluster is
being queried, so he discards the data from ch9, and generates and passes E lch6(sensed data) to ch3.
At this point of time, ch3 may have already received E lch5(dummy data) and E lch4(dummy data)
from its dependent nodes ch5 and ch4, respectively. If not, ch3 waits until it gets the data from
all its dependent nodes. The reason why a node does not proceed until receives from all its
dependent nodes is to avoid disclosure of information from timing patterns. Then ch3 decrypts
E lch6(sensed data) and re-encrypts sensed date to yield E lch3(sensed data), it then passes the data to
the access point ch1. The access point ch1 waits until it gets data from all other routing pathes, and
then decrypts E lch3(sensed data) and re-encrypts sensed date to yield E lch1(sensed data). Finally,
ch1 sends E lch1(sensed data) to the querying user as the query result.
In our approach, every cluster head sends out l packets. Due to the semantic security of
encryption, re-encryptions of the same data are not distinguishable. Therefore, the adversary
watching the network cannot tell if the l packets sent out by a cluster head originate from the
cluster head itself or from its dependent nodes.
Algorithm Details A complete description of the algorithm in pseudo codes is shown in Algo-
rithm 1, where u denotes the querying user and ap denotes the access point.
To start, the user contacts the access point by sending a hello message, including a nounce that
will be used in the ensuing attestation process (Step 1). The access point then informs all the other
cluster heads to form routing pathes using the method described earlier (Step 2). Before sending
a query, the user must have assurance of the trustfulness of the cluster heads. This is achieved by
means of attestation (Step 3). Note that it is unnecessary for the user to check the status of all
cluster heads, which is quite expensive; it suffices to adopt the strategy of “chained attestation”
along the established routing pathes. In particular, referring to Figure 3, u only verifies the access
point: ch9 is verified by ch6; ch4, ch5 and ch6 are verified by ch3; ch8 is verified by ch7 who is in
return verified by ch2; ch2 and ch3 are verified by the access point.
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Algorithm 1 Achieving User Query Privacy.
1: u→ ap: hello
2: ap↔ {chi}i: establish routing pathes.
3: u↔ ap: attestation
4: u→ ap: eu = Eu(c) /*c is the identifier of the target cluster*/
5: ap→ {chi}i: eu
6: for EACH chi do
7: c = Dchi(eu)
8: {sensor} → chi: dataci = {CEci(sensed data)}
9: {dependent node} → chi: {packets} /*chi waits until gets packets from all its dependent nodes*/
10: if chi ∈ c then
11: /*if chi is cluster head of the target cluster c */
12: packets = CDci(dataci)
13: packets = head||content = Ec(c)||E lchi(packets)
14: else
15: foundqueriedcluster = FALSE
16: for packets from EACH dependent node do
17: c′ = Dchi(head)
18: if c′ == c then
19: content′ = Dchi(content)
20: packets = head||content = Echi(c)||E lchi(content′)
21: foundqueriedcluster = TRUE
22: break
23: end if
24: end for
25: if foundqueriedcluster == FALSE then
26: packets = head||content = Echi(ci)||E lchi(dummy date)
27: end if
28: end if
29: chi → forward node: packets
30: end for
31: ap→ u: packets
Once attestation is successful, the user sends to the access point the query eu, which is the
encryption of the identifier c of the target cluster using the shared secret key (Step 4). The access
point broadcasts the query to all other cluster heads (Step 5), each decrypting the query and
knowing which cluster the user is querying (Step 7). Each cluster head then collects sensed data
(encrypted using the cluster key) from the sensor nodes of its cluster (Step 8).
Before sending out l packets of data to its forwarding node (Step 29), a cluster head must wait
until it receives packets from all its dependent nodes (Step 9). Afterwards, if the cluster itself is the
target cluster (Step 10-13), the cluster head simply ignores the packets from its dependent nodes,
and encrypts the sensed data from its cluster. Note that every set of l packets consists of head and
content, where the head is used to inform cluster heads enroute the origin of the l packets while
without decrypting the content. For a cluster that is not the target one (Step 14-27), the cluster
head checks whether one of its dependent nodes sends in the data of the target cluster. If yes,
the cluster head re-encrypts the data (Step 16-22); otherwise, the cluster head generates l dummy
packets (Step 25-27). Eventually, the access point passes the l packets of the target cluster to the
querying user (Step 31).
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Security Analysis We can argue security of our algorithm from two aspects: data communicated
and communication patterns. For the first aspect, it is somewhat straightforward to see that due to
the use of semantic secure encryption, data communicated do not divulge the content of messages.
More formal proof can be constructed based on simulation: define view of a query to be all data
communicated across the network to answer the query. It can be proven that for any query q, any
PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator A∗ such that |Pr[A(view) = f(q)]−Pr[A∗(struc) =
f(q)]| is negligible, as long as the encryption scheme is a pseudo-random permutation, where f(q)
is any function on the result of query q, and struc is the structure of the underlying sensor network.
For the second aspect, it is clear that every query results in the same communication pattern, i.e.,
every cluster head reads sensed data from the sensor nodes in its cluster; every cluster head sends
out l packets to its forwarding node after receiving data from all its dependent nodes. Altogether,
observing communication in the network does not in any way help the adversary to figure out which
cluster is the query target.
4.1.3 Improvement
In the above scheme, to answer a user query all the sensor nodes are asked to send data to their
respective cluster heads. This may shorten the lifetime of the network because of excess energy
consumption. To mitigate this problem, We can alternatively trade off data freshness for energy
efficiency, especially when queries come in at a high rate. In particular, sensor nodes periodically
provide the sensed data to their respective cluster heads, who cache the data. The cluster heads
then handle user queries using the cached data rather than collecting realtime data from the sensor
nodes.
4.1.4 Comparison
The only earlier work we are aware of studying user query privacy is [7]. The two-server approach
in [7] uses a routing scheme for data transmission similar to onion routing [15]. The routing path
is constructed dynamically among the sensor nodes for each query. We list the comparison results
between our approach and that in [7] in Table 1. To be more specific, our scheme assumes a global
Adversary model Sensor storage Sensor com-
putation
Sensor com-
munication
User regis-
tration
Our scheme Global eaves-
dropper
Constant Constant Constant No
Scheme in [7] Local eavesdrop-
per
Linear to the
total number
of users
Related to
routing path
Related to
routing path
yes
Table 1: Comparison Results
eavesdropper, so achieving better privacy. A sensor node in our scheme only needs to store a secret
cluster key, while each sensor in [7] is required to store secret data linear to the total number of
users authorized to query the network. On computation and communication, each sensor node in
our scheme needs to encrypt its sensed data and sends to its cluster head, or is required to relay
data from other nodes in the same cluster; as the routing pathes must be short within a cluster, the
computation and communication are thus constant. In contrast, computation and communication
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for a sensor node in [7] depend on the routing path from the target cluster to the querying user.
Finally, in [7] every authorized user is required to register to the servers, which in turn store secret
data for the user’s virtual name on each sensor node; sensor nodes in our scheme on the contrary
have nothing to do with user registration. To conclude, the comparison results show that our
scheme outperforms [7] in all aspects.
4.2 Achieving Source Location Privacy
Source location privacy is concerned with not letting the adversary know which sensor node sends
data to a sink (the base station). Most existing approaches, e.g., [26, 34, 36], consider local eaves-
droppers who can only trace transmission hop by hop. An exception is [32], which assumes a global
eavesdropper. The commonly used methods for achieving source location privacy are random walk,
source simulation, or a combination of the two. The random walk method generates a random
routing path from the source node to the sink for each transmission, while the source simulation
method generates a number of fake source nodes simulating the actual source sensor, so as to
confuse the adversary.
It appears that the random walk method is not effective under the global adversary overseeing
the entire network, since the adversary always knows from which node packets originated. Our
heterogeneous network architecture facilitates a much more efficient implementation of source sim-
ulation. In particular, to simulate the actual source node sending a packet to its cluster head, every
other cluster head randomly chooses a sensor node in its cluster to send a fake packet. Afterwards,
cluster heads send their packets to the sink. Intuitively, source location privacy can be considered
as a special case of user query privacy in our architecture. In order to keep the paper compact, we
omit the details of the scheme, but it should not be difficult to specify, given the earlier scheme for
user query privacy.
Source simulation in our architecture is more efficient than that in [32], due to the shortened
routing pathes and reduced control messages resulting from the use of high-end cluster heads.
5 Related Work
Partitioning a WSN into clusters were proposed by several authors for achieving scalability and
better performance [2, 3, 11, 21]. In these schemes, one or more sensor nodes within a cluster are
chosen as cluster head (i.e., homogeneous clustered WSNs). On the other hand, considering the
limited capabilities of sensor nodes, studies from both the research community and the industry
sector have tried to enhance network performance by incorporating a number of more powerful
nodes in WSNs (i.e., heterogeneous clustered WSNs). A detailed theoretical analysis on the effect
of adding powerful nodes to WSNs was given in [44]. It is concluded that only a modest number of
reliable, long-range backhaul links and line-powered nodes are required to have a significant effect,
and if properly deployed, heterogeneity can triple the average delivery rate and a 5-fold increase in
the lifetime of a large battery-powered sensor networks. Intel has an on-going experimental effort
[20] to incorporate Intel XScaler based nodes into WSNs. The experiment indicated that data
traversing across a network are routed biased towards the XScaler nodes over simple sensor nodes,
thereby indeed enhancing the overall system performance. [12, 35, 44] are among the work to study
security issues in the homogeneous or heterogeneous clustered WSNs.
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Our study of TC-enabled WSNs is motivated by the above idea of network clustering and het-
erogeneity, and TCG’s trusted computing technology. The heterogeneous architecture we proposed
differs from the existing heterogeneous networks such as [4, 20, 35, 44] in that the high-end clus-
ter heads in our WSNs are TC-enabled. This makes our WSNs not only have improved network
performance, but also greatly facilitate security enforcement, as we have demonstrated earlier.
We realized that we are not the first to propose the idea of equipping some more powerful cluster
heads in a WSN with trusted computing technology. [14, 23] also discussed similar ideas. More
specifically, [23] proposed lightweight attestation techniques that can help regular sensor nodes to
check the status of a TC-enabled cluster head’s platform, and [14] studied key establishment and
management between sensor nodes and the base station, with the help of TC-enabled cluster heads.
There seems no essential difference in the network architecture between our proposal and that of
[14, 23]. However, the techniques proposed in [14, 23] are intended for the sensor nodes to perform
attestation so as to check the platform state of the cluster heads. In contrast, in our architecture
the sensor nodes never attempt to check the trustfulness of the cluster heads, and they simply
trust their respective cluster heads. Our justification for this is that it is the responsibility of the
end users of the network to concern about the trustfulness of the cluster heads. Other difference
between our work and [14, 23] is that different security issues in WSNs were addressed.
Trusted computing technology has also been proposed to protect privacy in RFID systems (the
RFID tags forming a RFID system are also quite weak in capabilities), where a TPM is attached to
the RFID reader [33] in order to make the reader act according to the established privacy policies.
Another work to protect RFID privacy is [22] which proposes to incorporate powerful devices into a
RFID system, and the devices are designed to simulate the behavior of the RFID tags and the tags
themselves are made dormant. The devices are simply assumed to be trusted, but how to make
the assumption practically true is unclear. RFID systems have quite different working mechanisms
from WSNs, thus the security concerns, and in turn the challenges in enforcing security, in the two
are significantly different.
In this work, we focused on privacy protection in WSNs, and provided better solutions to
two important privacy issues than existing proposals [7, 26, 32, 34, 36]. Another privacy issue in
WSNs discussed in the literature is temporal privacy [25], which is concerned with the fact that an
adversary, by simply monitoring the arrival of packets at the sink, can infer the temporal patterns
of interested events. While we did not address the temporal privacy issue for lack of space, we
believe our TC-enabled heterogeneous architecture is in a better position to solve the problem,
because the trusted cluster heads should be able to perform timing synchronization more reliably
and easily.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Due to stringent resource limitations of sensor nodes, security enforcement is extremely challenging
in wireless sensor networks. To solve this problem, we proposed to render a wireless sensor network
heterogeneous, by incorporating TC-equipped high-end devices into clusters of the network, acting
as cluster heads. We demonstrated how the TC-enabled cluster heads can effectively address privacy
issues in WSNs.
This study is still in the preliminary stage. We are preparing to implement proof-of-the-concept
TC-enabled WSN architecture, and further experiment with the architecture in certain real world
wireless sensor network settings.
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